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 Prior to noncooperative choices of abatement of a transboundary pollutant, a
 technologically advanced country considers making an unconditional transfer
 of abatement technology to its less-advanced rival. Even though technological
 aid is given unconditionally and abatement strategies are chosen noncoopera-
 tively, in a number of plausible circumstances, a transfer of a superior control
 technology will induce Pareto-superior pollution abatement.
 Keywords : international environmental policy, technology transfer.
 JEL Classifications : C71, D74, Q20.
 1 Introduction
 Many believe that the transfer of "clean technologies" to less-advanced
 countries will be an effective, even necessary, policy prescription to
 confront international environmental problems (French, 1992; Heaton
 et al., 1991; Levy et al., 1993; Pearce, 1991; von Moltke, 1992).1 Guar-
 anteeing easy access to new technologies is often justified as a cost-
 effective way to reduce international emissions of some pollutants. For
 example, concerning the policy debate about confronting global cli-
 mate change, there appears to be significant potential for improving the
 efficiency of energy use in the developing world. Transferring energy-
 efficient technologies to less-advanced countries may be a relatively
 inexpensive way to reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases (De
 Canio and Lee, 1991; Coppel, 1994). Facilitating the transfer of clean
 technologies has also been made a concrete part of a number of interna-
 1 "Clean technologies" genetically refer to a wide range of devices, man-
 agement techniques, and materials that are used to control emissions or produce
 goods and services with lower environmental impacts.
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 tional environmental agreements. For example, the 1989 "Basel Con-
 vention on Hazardous Wastes" obligates parties to provide technical
 assistance to less-developed parties. Under the 1990 "London Amend-
 ments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
 Layer," industrialized parties to the Protocol are to make ozone-benign
 technologies (substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons and halons) available
 to developing countries on "fair and most favorable terms" (Benedick,
 1991; Parsons, 1993).
 Despite the consensus that technology transfer is likely to be an
 effective policy instrument in international environmental relations, the
 economic and game-theoretic literature on international environmental
 conflict resolution lacks a rigorous examination of its strategic poten-
 tial.2 Hence, in this paper we will consider whether a country can use
 technological aid to its strategic advantage in a two-country game of
 abatement of a transboundary pollutant.
 We will restrict our attention to situations in which the countries do
 not expect to come to a binding agreement to control emissions of the
 pollutant, so the game is completely noncooperative. Furthermore, as
 is often assumed in the literature on international environmental prob-
 lems, reducing emissions of the transboundary pollutant is modeled
 as a contribution to a pure public good (international environmental
 quality).3 We shall consider a two-stage game. In the first stage of
 the game, the technologically advanced country may make an uncon-
 ditional gift of a superior abatement technology to the other country.
 In the second stage, the countries noncooperatively choose their abate-
 ment strategies.4 In this context, we will find that a number of plausible
 2 Some examples of theoretical analyses of international environmental
 conflict and resolution include Barrett (1994), Black et al. (1993), Carraro and
 Siniscalco (1993), Hoel (1991), Mäler (1991), Sandler and Sargent (1995), and
 Welsch (1993). None of these papers consider the role of technology transfer.
 3 The theory of private contributions to public goods is relevant here.
 A typical list of citations will include Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Cornes
 and Sandler (1986) among many others. Recent contributions include Varían
 (1994), Konrad (1994), and Buchholz and Konrad (1995). The assumption
 that abatement is a contribution to a pure public good is appropriate when
 considering problems like ozone depletion and global climate change which
 are generated by uniformly mixed pollutants. Hoel (1991), Welsch (1993),
 and Buchholz and Konrad (1994) assume a uniformly mixed pollutant. If the
 pollutant is not uniformly mixed the damage inflicted on a particular country
 depends on the source of emissions. For examples, see Maler (1991) who
 models European acid rain and Carraro and Siniscalco (1993).
 4 As a model of a prior strategic investment to affect the outcome or a
 future noncooperative game, the paper is related to the industrial-organization
 Technological Aid in Environmental Relations 3
 circumstances exist under which the advanced country will be able to
 use technological aid to its strategic advantage. Furthermore, when the
 advanced country transfers technology to the other, it induces Pareto-
 superior abatement choices. Thus, the results of this paper lend some
 theoretical support to the widespread belief that transferring superior
 abatement technologies can be an effective policy instrument in inter-
 national environmental relations. However, because we also find that
 there are equally plausible situations in which a Pareto-superior out-
 come cannot be induced, policy recommendations about technological
 aid in a noncooperative setting should be considered cautiously.5
 As a model of actions taken about abatement technology prior to
 abatement choices, this paper is closely related to a recent paper by
 Buchholz and Konrad (1994), in which they consider each country's
 adoption decision prior to abatement choices. They find that countries
 face a rather perverse incentive to adopt inferior technologies (in the
 sense that they involve higher unit abatement costs than other available
 technologies) so that they can precommit themselves to lower abate-
 ment in the future.6 This paper differs from theirs because they do
 not consider technology transfer and we will not consider individual
 commitments to an abatement technology. Interestingly, the strategic
 aspects of the two approaches are quite similar. A technologically-ad-
 vanced country has the incentive to transfer a superior technology for
 the same reason a country is motivated to choose an inferior technology
 for itself; both actions tend to shift the burden of reducing emissions
 onto others. However, as we shall find, the welfare and environmental
 consequences of the two types of actions are very different.
 A relatively general version of the game is described in Sect. 2.
 This section provides a number of interesting results about the effects
 of transferring a superior technology on second-stage abatement choices
 literature on strategic investments to forestall entry or expansion of a rival
 firm. (Typical references include Dixit, 1981, Fudenberg and Tiróle, 1984,
 and Gilbert, 1989, among many others.)
 5 Since this paper assumes that the advanced country is restricted to giving
 its rival a superior abatement technology, it does not consider the possibility of
 mutually advantageous trades in which the less-advanced country purchases a
 superior abatement technology. Allowing such trades should result in a larger
 set of Pareto-improving transfers.
 6 They also find that a nation is motivated to adopt inferior abatement
 technologies prior to a cooperative agreement because doing so will improve
 its bargaining position. In a related paper, Copeland (1990) finds that, in the
 absence of international cooperation, countries may have a strategic incen-
 tive to degrade common property resources to influence the behavior of rival
 nations.
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 and a characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibrium. To provide
 a clearer picture of equilibrium transfers, an example is presented in
 Sect. 3. In this section we will see that the policy problem of identifying
 an optimal transfer may be quite difficult. Section 4 concludes.
 2 The Game
 The players of the game are two countries, which we shall call the North
 and the South. (Imagine benevolent governments acting on behalf of
 their citizens.) Suppose throughout that the North possesses superior
 abatement technologies. In the first stage of the game, it may give a
 superior abatement technology to the South to influence the outcome
 of the second-stage abatement game. The transfer of a superior tech-
 nology is completely unconditional - the South does not pay a price
 for a superior technology, nor is it obligated to a particular abatement
 choice in the second stage of the game. A subgame-perfect equilibrium
 of this game consists of a technology transfer in the first stage, and
 noncooperative abatement choices in the second stage, conditional on
 the first-stage transfer.
 2.1 Technology Transfer
 Let the total cost of *n units of abatement by the North be the mono-
 tonically increasing and strictly convex function cn(*n)- The South's
 abatement cost function is assumed to be cs(*s, 0 which is increasing
 at an increasing rate in its abatement xs- The variable t is taken from a
 continuous, nonnegative index of technologies defined on the closed in-
 terval [0, /°]. The index orders the technologies according to their effec-
 tiveness in reducing the South's abatement cost so that cs(xs, t ) is de-
 creasing in t. We will also assume that the South's marginal abatement
 cost is decreasing in t. Therefore, dcs/dt < 0 and d2cs/dxsdt < 0.
 We will say that ť is superior to (or more effective than) t" if ť > t".
 Let t = 0 denote the technology that the South possesses at the
 beginning of the game, and let t° denote the best technology that the
 North possesses. In addition, the North possesses, or can develop at
 some cost, technologies that are inferior to t°, but superior to technol-
 ogy 0. The open interval (0, t° ) contains these technologies, each of
 which the North may choose to give to the South.
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 2.2 Second-stage Abatement
 The welfare of country i is given by a utility function u¡ (jcn + Jts, y¡),
 which we shall assume is increasing at a decreasing rate in total abate-
 ment and increasing at a nonincreasing rate in private consumption.
 We shall also assume that consumption of environmental quality and
 the private good are weakly complementary. That is, d2u¡/dXdy¡ > 0,
 where X = jcn + *s. These assumptions along with those concerning
 abatement costs are sufficient to guarantee the results of this section.7
 Let the price of private consumption be unity and let country V s
 exogenously given national income be m(. Thus, the North's budget
 constraint is win = w + cn(jcn) and the South's is ms = ys + cs(*s> t).
 A subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game requires that second-stage
 abatement choices form a Nash noncooperative equilibrium that is con-
 ditional on the first-stage technology transfer. Given a technology that
 the South actually implements, a second-stage equilibrium is a pair of
 abatement choices which solve the following optimiza-
 tion problems simultaneously:
 max«N(xN + *s, wN - cn(*N)) ,
 JCN
 (1)
 max wsUn + ^s^s- csUs, t )) .
 To analyze how the first-stage technology transfer affects second-
 stage abatement choices, let us consider the Nash best-response func-
 tions of the countries and focus on unique, interior second-stage equi-
 libria. For the North the best-response function is jcn = 0 nUs) which
 is implicitly defined by the first-order condition 9mn/9*n = du^/dX
 - (dux/dyn)cfN = 0. The best-response function of the South is xs
 = 0s C*N» t) which is implicitly defined by dus/dxs = dus/dX - ( dus /
 dys)(dcs/dxs) = 0.8 The best-response functions have the following
 characteristics:
 d<M*s) w t m 90s Un, 0 _ , , m ^ 90s Un, 0 n
 -
 axs ox N ot
 (2)
 7 With d2Ui/dXdyi > 0, it can be shown that environmental quality and
 private consumption are strictly normal goods. That is, holding abatement of
 the other nation constant, an increase in income will be allocated to increased
 abatement and increased consumption of the private good.
 8 Of course, the best-response functions also depend on income levels,
 but these are ignored because they are not needed for our purposes.
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 (These relations are derived in Appendix 1.) The first two relations
 indicate that a unit increase in a country's abatement motivates its rival
 to reduce its abatement, but by less than a unit. The third relation
 indicates that, given an abatement choice by the North, the transfer of
 a superior technology motivates the South to increase its abatement.
 If the second-stage equilibrium is unique, the North's equilibrium
 abatement must satisfy x^(t) = </>n[0s(*n (0>0L Differentiating this
 identity and rearranging yields
 <^n(0 _ rd^N 90S IL d<t> N dfol-1 . 0 (3 àt _ Ldxs J L dxs 9*N-I
 The sign of this marginal effect follows from the characteristics of the
 best-response functions given by (2). In addition, the South' s equilib-
 rium abatement must satisfy xg(t) = <ps(x^(t), 0- Differentiating this
 identity yields
 ck|(0 _ dfedx£ <Ws>0 4
 At 3jcn d t 3 1
 Lastly, one can use (3) and (4) to obtain the marginal relationship
 between total abatement and the first-stage transfer:
 +x¡(t)] _ 30s f. d0Nir d^S^s]-1 0 ...
 d t _ 3 1 L djcs J L djcs 3JCNJ
 Taken together, (3), (4), and (5) give us the equilibrium conse-
 quences of transferring a more effective abatement technology. Since
 a superior technology lowers the abatement cost (total and marginal)
 of the South, it is willing to take on a larger abatement burden. In
 response, the North reduces its abatement, but the overall effect is that
 total abatement increases. (The effects of transferring a more effective
 technology ť > t are illustrated in Fig. 1.) These are essentially the
 strategic aspects of technological aid when two governments face a bi-
 lateral pollution problem in a noncooperative fashion. By investing in
 the abatement capability of another, a technologically advanced country
 can shift a portion of the burden of controlling emissions away from
 itself. Furthermore, such an investment leads to better environmental
 quality in both nations.9
 9 Note that these results do not depend on the relative preferences for
 environmental quality in the North and South, nor do they depend on their
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 Fig. 1 : The effects of transferring a more effective abatement technology on
 equilibrium abatement choices in the second stage
 It is instructive to compare these results to those of Buchholz and
 Konrad (1994). They found that countries are motivated to adopt in-
 ferior abatement technologies to shift the burden of providing pollu-
 tion control onto others. Adoption of a technology with higher unit
 abatement cost precommits a country to lower abatement in the fu-
 ture. (They assume constant marginal abatement costs.) In equilibrium,
 others respond with higher abatement. The essential aspect that drives
 the burden-shift is that the relative unit-abatement costs change. Adop-
 tion of an inferior technology implies that others have relatively lower
 unit-control costs, and hence, in equilibrium, they end up taking on a
 relatively larger abatement burden. A similar thing happens when one
 country provides another with a superior abatement technology; the
 donor nation's marginal control costs increase relative to the other's.
 In equilibrium, this induces a shift of the abatement burden onto the
 less-advanced nation. Though the burden-shifting characteristic of the
 two actions are the same, the environmental and welfare consequences
 are very different. Buchholz and Konrad find that environmental qual-
 ity is unambiguously worse when nations strategically adopt inferior
 relative control costs. In particular, the results do not require the North to have
 stronger demand for environmental quality or lower abatement costs. However,
 whether or not the focus on interior choices is justified will depend on relative
 preferences and costs. For example, if the North has significantly stronger
 preferences for environmental quality and significantly lower control costs,
 its choice of abatement may completely "crowd out" the South' s incentive to
 control its own emissions.
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 control technologies, while we find that environmental quality is un-
 ambiguously better when a superior abatement technology is given to
 a less-advanced nation. Not surprisingly, they also find that strategic
 technology adoption has adverse welfare consequence. In contrast, we
 will be able to characterize situations in which technological aid induces
 Pareto-superior outcomes.
 Since the underlying motivation for the North is to increase its con-
 trol costs relative to the South' s, it seems likely that the incentive to
 adopt an inferior control technology that Buchholz and Konrad iden-
 tify will exist in spite of the North's motivation to transfer a superior
 technology to the South. That is, the North may find it optimal to si-
 multaneously transfer a superior technology to the South and adopt an
 inferior technology for itself. In this paper we will ignore the latter
 incentive except to note that the transfer of superior technologies may
 enjoy broader political support than the adoption of an inferior tech-
 nology. Thus, even though it may be rational for a country to adopt
 an inferior technology, it may not be politically feasible. Regardless, a
 more complete model of strategic technological choice in international
 environmental relations would allow for both actions.
 In another related paper, Maijit (1990) finds conditions under which
 a technologically advanced firm can sell a superior production technol-
 ogy to its less-advanced Cournot rival. With linear demand and constant
 marginal production costs, it is straightforward to show that the strate-
 gic effects of a technology transfer are similar to those in the public-
 goods context; namely, output of the advanced firm decreases, output
 of its rival increases, and total industry output increases. However, in
 the duopoly situation, the transfer of a superior production technology
 without compensation would lead to lower profit for the advanced firm
 and higher profit for the less-advanced firm. Clearly, a superior produc-
 tion technology will never be freely given. If a transfer is to take place
 the less-advanced firm's gain in production profit must be large enough
 so that it is able to compensate àie advanced firm for its loss of profit.
 In contrast, in the public-goods context the welfare of the North (ex-
 cluding the costs of the transfer) must increase because environmental
 quality improves and it is able to reduce its emissions control. Hence,
 if the transfer cost is low enough, the North will always have an in-
 centive to transfer a superior control technology without compensation
 from the South.
 However, the South is not necessarily better off with a superior tech-
 nology. Consider the South's equilibrium welfare u'(t) = us(x£(t) +
 x£(t), m s - es (xg(t), 0). To see why the South may be worse off with
 a marginally superior technology, differentiate Ug(t) and use the first-
 order condition dus/dxs = dus/dX - (dus/dys)(dcs/dxs) = 0 to
 Technological Aid in Environmental Relations 9
 obtain
 d u$(t) _ dus 3ms 3^s
 d¿ dX d t dys dt
 Note that du^(t)/dt has the same sign as
 dus/dX dx * des
 3ws/3;ys dř 3í
 Equation (6) shows that the South experiences a cost and a benefit
 from the transfer and adoption of a superior control technology. Recall
 that the transfer of a superior technology allows the North to reduce
 its emissions control. The first term in Eq. (6) is the value that the
 South places on the North's reduced emissions control. The second
 term is the reduction in the South' s abatement costs due to adoption
 of the superior technology at its equilibrium abatement choice. Thus,
 if adopting a superior technology induces a relatively small reduction
 in the South' s abatement costs, but a relatively large reduction in the
 North's equilibrium abatement which the South places a high value on,
 it may be worse off with a superior technology.
 We shall give the South the ability to refuse a superior technology
 if its welfare is not improved. Let us assume for simplicity that if the
 South is offered a superior technology t > 0, it either adopts t or
 stays with its own technology 0. This assumption implies that receipt
 of some technology t does not make other technologies available to the
 South that are inferior to t , but superior to technology 0. Given some
 transfer f , denote the adoption strategy of the South as i (t) and note that
 i0 if uUt) < «*(0),
 i(t ) = '
 [t if U*s(t) > W*(0).
 Clearly, this strategy does not involve any noncredible threats. There-
 fore, the North must account for this adoption strategy when it chooses
 a technology to transfer.
 2.3 First-stage Technology Transfer
 The North chooses a technology transfer in the first stage of the game
 by looking forward to the second-stage outcome. Transferring a tech-
 nology has a cost which may include the costs of providing technical
 assistance for the installation and maintenance of a new abatement
 technology; expenditures to find and develop new technologies, or to
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 modify existing technologies to make them appropriate for use in the
 South, and perhaps receipts that are foregone because a superior tech-
 nology is simply given away. In this paper we assume that the North
 bears all the transfer costs, though one can easily imagine an agree-
 ment between the nations to share these costs. Allowing for such an
 agreement would result in a larger set of Pareto-improving transfers.
 Suppose that the cost of transferring a technology t is given by
 w(t) which is increasing at a nondecreasing rate. Since a transfer is
 costly, the North will only transfer technologies that the South will
 adopt, and thus, the North's transfer choice must satisfy t = i(t). With
 this constraint in mind, the optimal transfer is determined by
 max«Ntó(0 +*s(0, ffiN - w(t) - cnCcnO)))
 (7)
 s.t. t e [0, f°], t = i(0 .
 A first-stage transfer t* that is a solution to (7) and the second-stage
 abatement pair [jcj^(r*), jc|(/*)] form a subgame-perfect equilibrium for
 the entire game.
 Note that if the solution to (7) is such that t* > 0, it must be a
 Pareto-improvement on the no-transfer case. Clearly, if t* > 0 is a
 solution to (6), the North must be better off than in the no-transfer
 case. Also, since a solution t* > 0 must satisfy the South's adoption
 requirement, it must also be better off than in the no-transfer case.
 We conclude: If the North finds it optimal to transfer a superior
 technology to the South, doing so will induce Pareto-superior pollution
 control.10
 Observe that this result is due to the structure of the game, not to
 any particular assumption about preferences or abatement costs.
 3 Subgame-perfect Technological Aid: an Example
 Unfortunately, at the level of generality assumed in the last section, a
 fuller characterization of possible subgame-perfect transfers is not pos-
 sible. In this section we shall examine an example in which quadratic
 forms with nice curvature properties are adopted to uniquely identify
 equilibrium transfers. The example is used to illustrate an aspect of
 10 Of course, because abatement strategies are chosen noncooperatively,
 the transfer of a superior technology cannot induce fully efficient pollution
 control.
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 technological aid that may be a significant consideration for policy-
 makers in advanced countries. Namely, even though the utility and
 cost functions may be simple and well-behaved, the objective function
 for the North in the first stage of the game can easily be quite complex
 with boundary maxima and/or multiple local maxima. Thus, to actually
 identify a globally optimal transfer, policymakers in advanced countries
 may face the difficult task of estimating transfer costs and the benefits
 of pollution control; including, of course, the strategic interdependence
 of control policies, over the entire range of possible transfers.11
 Assume that the utility functions are the following:
 Mn(*N, Jn) = ßti(XN + *s) - ¿(*N + *s)2 + W ,
 and
 *7 2
 Ws Un, ys) = ßs Un + *s) - ^ Un + *s) 2 + Js ,
 where ß^, ßs , and r] are positive constants. Note that these utility func-
 tions are quasi-linear and strictly concave in pollution control. It seems
 likely that the country with superior abatement technologies generally
 has a stronger preference for environmental quality, so the analysis as-
 sumes that the North's demand for environmental quality is at least as
 strong as the South' s. To capture this, we will assume that ß n > ßs
 and r¡ > 1. Under these assumptions, the marginal benefit to the South
 of total abatement does not lie above that of the North, and is at least
 as steep.
 Suppose that the North's abatement-cost function is cUw) =
 and let the South's abatement-cost function be csUs> = [(« - ^r^)/2] •
 X |, where a > 1 and ix is a positive constant. Suppose that the range of
 (a-nt) is the closed interval [1, a]. Then, t is defined on [0, (a - l)/n].
 Note that if the North transfers its best technology t° = (a - the
 abatement-cost functions of the two countries will be identical, other-
 wise the South's abatement cost lies above the North's.
 Let us assume throughout that national incomes are sufficient to
 guarantee that the game admits equilibria in which private consump-
 tion by both countries is strictly positive. This assumption and quasi-
 linearity of the utility functions lets us ignore national incomes since
 they will have no bearing on optimal choices. Then, the counterparts
 1 1 This problem is related to the well-known policy problem of non-
 convexities that arise in externality-control problems. See Baumol and Oates
 (1988) for an introduction, and Helfand and Rubin (1994) for a recent contri-
 bution.
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 of the optimization problems given by (1) are,
 max wn(*n, *s) = £n(*n + *s) - |(*n + xs)2 - »
 *N
 and (8)
 rj 2 a ~~ 2
 max us(x N, *s) = #s(*n + xs) - -(*n + *s) 2
 2 2
 Note that the objectives are strictly concave in individual abatement.
 Given some transfer from the fi st stage th t the South a opts, and as-
 suming an interior sec nd-stage equilibrium, the equilibrium abatement
 choices are
 x. = ft.fr, + («-»»)) -ft md x.(l) = 2ft - """ . .2
 r} + 2(a - nt) + 2(a - nt)
 (9)
 (All the derivations of this section are given in Appendix 2.) We will
 focus on interior equilibrium abatement, which is guaranteed for all t
 e [0, ( a - 1 ) / 7T ] if and only if (2/t])ßs > ßn > (l/2)>8s-
 The payoff function for the South given some technology that it
 adopts is
 «s(0 = &[*N(0 +*!(')] - |[*N(0 +*S*(')]2 - . (10)
 It is shown in Appendix 2 that u$(t) is strictly increasing in more ef-
 fective technologies. Thus, for this example, if the South' s equilibrium
 abatement choice is expected to be positive, it will adopt any superior
 abatement technology that the North chooses to transfer.13
 To this point we have a very well-behaved system. The second-stage
 equilibrium choices of pollution control are unique, and, assuming as
 we do that they are interior choices, the South will adopt any superior
 12 Note that the North's equilibrium abatement is decreasing in t, while
 the South' s equilibrium abatement is increasing in t. Furthermore, it is easy
 to show that total abatement is increasing in t. These confirm our results
 from Sect. 2 that transferring a superior technology in the first stage allows
 the North to shift a portion of the burden of abatement onto the South and
 induces greater total abatement.
 13 Even though the South' s adoption strategy does not bind the North s
 choice of aid in this example, recall that this result cannot be generated in
 more general versions of the game.
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 technology the North chooses to transfer. The only thing left is for the
 North to choose a transfer t e [0, ř°] that maximizes u^(t) - w(t),
 where
 = MxUO + *s(0] - ¿[*n(0 + *s(012 - ^n(02 • (1 D
 As expected, «^(i) *s strictly increasing in more effective technolo-
 gies. However, assuming as we have been that the North's demand for
 environmental quality is at least as strong as the South's, u^(t) and
 d«j^(ř)/dř are both strictly convex for all t e [0, ( a - 1)/jt]. (This
 result is also derived in Appendix 2.) Then, since w{t) is convex (per-
 haps weakly), the North's objective in the first stage of the game, wj^(i)
 - w(t), will likely lack the concavity property necessary for easy iden-
 tification of an optimal transfer.14
 Now, let us identify the possible subgame-perfect transfers for this
 example. To simplify matters, let us assume that the cost of transferring
 superior control technologies w(t) is increasing at a linearly increasing
 rate, and that there are no fixed costs associated with transferring tech-
 nology. (Of course, the presence of fixed costs can be another source of
 multiple local maxima.) Then, there are five cases to consider. The first
 three are illustrated in Fig. 2, which assumes that d«j^(0)/d/ > u>'( 0).
 In case A, the marginal transfer cost function w'A(t ) cuts d«£,(í)/dí
 once from below. In this case, the subgame-perfect transfer is r3, a rel-
 atively modest investment in the South's abatement technology. In case
 B, the marginal transfer cost function w'B(t) cuts d«^(ř)/dř twice, once
 from below and once from above. In this case, there are two locally
 optimal transfers, t 2 and t°. (Note that i1 identifies a local minimum.)
 In case C, the marginal transfer cost function w'c(t) lies everywhere
 below dM^(ř)/dř, so the subgame-perfect transfer is the best abatement
 technology t°.
 Cases B and C illustrate two important considerations for policy-
 makers in the North. First, because of the strict convexity of u^(t), there
 are plausible circumstances under which it is optimal for the North to
 provide its best control technology so that the countries' abatement ca-
 pabilities are equalized. Second, case B illustrates the possibility of two
 locally optimal transfers, one of which is the transfer of the best tech-
 nology. The presence of multiple local maxima is problematic because
 if the North considers only incremental investments from the status quo
 14 This is true even though the underlying utility and abatement-cost
 functions are quite simple. With more complicated utility and cost functions,
 we should expect that the North's first-stage objective will be even more
 complex.
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 Fig. 2: Possible subgame perfect transfers when the North's preference for
 environmental quality is at least as strong as the South' s, and du£,(0)/di >
 u/(0)
 (t = 0), a simple "marginal benefit equal to marginal cost" rule will
 lead it to settle on a moderate transfer like t2 when a more radical
 investment like transferring its best technology may be the global op-
 timum. The fact that the optimal transfer may be die best technology
 and the possibility of multiple local optima seem to imply that poli-
 cymakers in the North need to be able to estimate the net benefits of
 pollution control and transfer costs over the entire range of potential
 transfers. Clearly, this will be a difficult task.
 The two remaining cases are illustrated in Fig. 3, which assumes
 dnj,(0)/df < u/(0).15 In case D, the marginal transfer cost function
 w'D(t) lies everywhere above du^CO/df. Here, any improvement in the
 South's abatement technology is too costly, so in the subgame-perfect
 equilibrium, no transfer takes place. In case E, the marginal transfer cost
 function w'E(t) cuts du£,(f)/d/ once from above, so the subgame-perfect
 equilibrium consists of the transfer of the best abatement technology
 or nothing at all. Case E is interesting because modest transfers are too
 costly, but equalizing the abatement capabilities of the two nations may
 be a Pareto-improvement. Again, a search only over incremental im-
 provements in die South's abatement capability may lead policymakers
 15 These cases also apply when diij,(0)/d/ = w'(0).
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 Fig. 3: Possible subgame perfect transfers when the North's preference for
 environmental quality is at least as strong as the South's, and d«^(0)/d/ <
 u/(0)
 in the North to discard technological aid as too expensive, when in
 fact the truly optimal policy is to make its best abatement technology
 available to the South.16
 4 Concluding Remarks
 By examining some of the circumstances under which an advanced
 nation can use technological aid to its strategic advantage, we have
 generated results that lend some theoretical support to policy recom-
 mendations about the transfer of superior pollution-control technologies
 to less-advanced nations. When a cooperative agreement to control a
 transboundary pollutant is prohibitively difficult, investing in the abate-
 ment capability of another affects future interaction in ways that are
 favorable to the donor nation; namely, the investment shifts a portion of
 the burden of noncooperative pollution control away from itself. With
 a similar model, Buchholz and Konrad (1994) found that countries
 may be motivated to adopt inferior abatement technologies for them-
 16 The problem of multiple local optima disappears with constant mar-
 ginal transfer costs, but in this case either no transfer is optimal or the transfer
 of the best technology is optimal.
 16 J. K. Stranlund
 selves for the same reason. But, the two strategies have very different
 welfare and environmental consequences. Adoption of an inferior con-
 trol technology, though rational from a single country's perspective,
 unambiguously leads to a Pareto-inferior pollution control and worse
 environmental quality. In contrast, when an advanced country finds it
 optimal to invest in the abatement capability of another, doing so will
 induce Pareto-superior control and better environmental quality.
 However, we have also identified a number of aspects of technolog-
 ical aid that should be cautionary notes for policymakers in advanced
 countries. In some cases, a less-advanced country may be made worse
 off by adopting a superior control technology. In other situations, tech-
 nological aid will just be too costly; the welfare gain that the donor
 nation expects from improved environmental quality and being able to
 choose a lower level of control does not outweigh the cost of transfer-
 ring a superior technology. Furthermore, in Sect. 3 we showed with an
 example that identifying an optimal transfer may be quite difficult. If
 policymakers in advanced countries do not consider benefits and costs
 over the full range of possible transfers, they may settle on a locally op-
 timal transfer that is not a global optimum. Or, examining only modest
 investments in the abatement capabilities of another nation may lead
 them to discard technological aid as too costly when, in fact, a grand
 investment may be optimal.
 There are a number of policy-relevant extensions of this paper that
 should be considered. For example, because we focused on a two-
 player game we have ignored the fact that a number of technologically
 advanced nations may consider policies of technological aid. Since each
 of the potential donor nations is made better off when one of them
 gives a superior technology to a less-advanced nation, each of them
 has an incentive to freeride on the technology transfers of the others.
 Furthermore, because of the freeriding incentive, the countervailing
 incentive to cooperate in the transfer of control technologies also exists.
 It seems likely that the incentives to freeride and cooperate will be
 important policy considerations in this context.
 This work should also be extended to consider the strategic poten-
 tial of technological aid when parties expect to come to a cooperative
 agreement to limit emissions of a global pollutant. One could consider
 whether an advanced country can use technological aid to stake-out a
 favorable negotiating position or to induce others to join an existing
 international environmental agreement. One might also consider how
 the strategic use of technological aid is likely to affect the terms of an
 eventual agreement, paying particiilar attention to the welfare and envi-
 ronmental consequences. Furthermore, since a number of international
 environmental agreements include provisions to facilitate technology
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 transfer, researchers should begin to think seriously about how these
 mechanisms ought to be designed. These issues (and probably others)
 should be pursued in future work to provide policymakers with a more
 complete characterization of the potential of technological aid in inter-
 national environmental relations.
 Appendix 1
 Our purpose is to show the following:
 à<t>N(xs) ^ 90s(*n, 0 , , m and . 90sC*n, t)
-
 curs 9*n ot
 Consider the South's optimization problem max^ «s(*nt + xs,ms -
 c$ (.v's , /)), and the first-order condition
 dus _ dus _ Sus des _ 0
 dxs SX dys dxs
 where X = xn + xs- This first-order condition implicitly defines the
 best-response function *s = 4>s(*n, t). Then,
 d<t>s _ dzu s/dxNdxs
 3*n d2us/dx'
 Now,
 32«s _ /d2us d2us 3cs' / d2us 3cs'
 3jts3;tN _ ~ ^3X2" ~ dXdys dx¡) ~ V3X3^3^/
 and
 32«s _ /32«s d2us dcs' / d2us 32ms3cs'3cs
 ~3x|~ _ ~ V3X2" ~ dXdys dxs ) ~ '3Z3js ~
 _ /32cs 3MS '
 ^ dxg dys /
 The assumptions we made in the text about the utility and abatement-
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 cost functions include
 dus A 32«s a 3«s a 32«s
 M>0' A 8 ^<0-Jis>a-ld-0- a a
 ^ >o > o, - 8cs > 0, and d - *» > 0 0 <A1) ava >o > o, - > 0, and d - T > 0 0 . dXdys ava dxs dx£ T
 Using (Al) we have
 92"s a 32"S a j 32«S 32"S
 - - - - < a 0, - r~ < a 0, and j - r- >
 dxg dxsdxtf
 which imply d<ps/dxu e (-1,0). [Note that the assumptions of (Al)
 are sufficient to obtain this result but are not necessary.] In a similar
 fashion, d^/dxs € (-1,0) is easily obtained. Lastly,
 90s _ d2us/dxsdt
 dt d2us/dx$
 where
 92"S _ / 32«s 9cs' /d2us des dcs' / d2cs 9«s'
 dxs dt 'dXdys dt / V 3_y| dxs dt / 'dxsdt 9ys'
 In addition to the assumptions listed in (Al), we also have dcs/dt < 0
 and d2cs/dxsdt < 0. Then, d2us/dxsdt > 0 which with 32ms/9jc| < 0
 implies 3</>s/9ř > 0.
 Appendix 2
 Given some transfer from the first-stage that the South adopts, and
 assuming an interior second-stage equilibrium, the first-order conditions
 to the optimization problems given by (8) in the text are
 ßN - *N -xs -*N = 0 (A2.1)
 and
 ßs - rç(*N + xs) - (a- nt)xs = 0 . (A2.2)
 Solving the first-order conditions yields the equilibrium abatement
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 choices given by (9) in the text:
 „* ^ _ Aifo + & - nt » - A ^ _ 2ßs - Tlßtf
 x-k¡ „* ^ 't) _ -
 rj + 2 (a - nt) , r] + 2 (a - nt)
 (A2.3)
 The marginal effects on abatement of the technology transferred in the
 first stage of the game are
 dxfift) -7T(2fe - UK) ; ' iA24i ( ' dt [r, + 2 (a - nt)]2 ; ' iA24i ( '
 d*g(0 _ 2n(-2ßs - nßti) „
 d t [r¡ + 2(a - nt)]2
 and
 á[x^t)+x¡(t)] n(2ß$ - T]ßti) n
 To show that the South' s payoff is increasing in superior technologies,
 consider
 u*s(t) = ßs[x^(t)+x*s(t)] - |[jt£(f) +je|(0]2 - ^f-xtit)2 .
 Differentiating, using the first-order condition (A2.2), and substituting
 for x¡¡(t) from (A2.3) and djt^(ř)/dí from (A2.4) yields
 du*s(t) _ nrj (2ßs - yß N)2
 dř 2 [r] + 2 (a - nt)]3
 Now consider the North's second-stage equilibrium payoff (absent the
 transfer cost):
 «Ñ(0 = M*n(0 + *s(0] - j[*n(0 + *s(0]2 - 3^(02 • (A2.7)
 To confirm that u^(t) is increasing in t, differentiate (A2.7) and use
 the first-order condition (A2.1) to obtain
 duUt) dxUt) .
 > 0 • (A2.8)
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 The inequality follows because dx|(ř)/dř > 0 [see (A2.5)]. To show
 that «Jf(0 and d«^(ř)/dí are both strictly convex, from (A2.8) obtain
 d2«*(r) d 2x¡it) , d*Ã(0< i*s*(0
 ~ď^-~ďP~XN{t) + , ~ďt ďT-
 Use (A2.3), (A2.4), and (A2.5) to obtain
 d2«J,(/) 2n2(2ßs - rifa)
 1¡¡- = t„ + 2(,-,r,)]'|5ft"' + iMa - n,) - 6ÄI '
 The first term on the right-hand side is positive, so concavity or convex-
 ity of «n(0 depends on the sign of G(t) = {5ß^rj+4ß^(a-nt)-6ßs}.
 That is, sign[d2Mj|j(0/dř2] = sign Git). Furthermore, it is easy to show
 that the sign of d3w^(/)/dr3 is the same as the sign of Hit) = {3 fat}
 + 2ßu(a - nt) -44s}- Now, since Git) and Hit) are both decreasing
 in t and t is at most (a - 1 )/n,
 Git) > {4 fait, + 1) + fan - 6ßs] , (A2.9)
 and
 Hit) > {2ßN it] + D + fav - 4ßs) , (A2.10)
 for all t € [0, ia - ')/n]. Assuming as we do that the North's demand
 for environmental quality is at least as strong as the South' s, so that
 ßii > ßs and r, > 1, the right-hand sides of (A2.9) and (A2.10) are
 strictly positive, and hence, Git) and Hit) are both strictly positive for
 all t e [0, ia- 1)/tt]. Thus, when the North's demand for environmental
 quality is at least as strong as the South's, wjÜ,(f) and d«^,(/)/d/ are both
 strictly convex.
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